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Approach to desirable events or stim-
uli of reward and avoidance of undesir-
able events or stimuli of non-reward or
punishment are powerful forces to drive
behavior. The importance of approach
and avoidance motivation has been out-
lined in many psychological theories
and traditions, including psychodynam-
ics, behaviorism and cognitivism (Elliot
and Covington, 2001). Of all theoreti-
cal accounts, the Reinforcement Sensitivity
Theory (RST) by Jeffrey Gray is prob-
ably the most elaborate perspective on
approach and avoidance (Gray, 1971; Gray
and McNaughton, 2000). Key contribu-
tions by Gray within this framework are
the identification of neural circuits under-
lying approach and avoidance behav-
ior, the description of these circuits as
neuropsychological systems with circum-
scribed functions in terms of a conceptual
nervous system, and the development of
a theory of personality based on individ-
ual differences in the reactivity of these
systems.
The plethora of empirical findings in
response to the initial formulation of RST
has led to a major revision of the the-
ory (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). In
the present commentary we focus on one
key aspect of the revised RST, namely the
processing of (non-)ambiguous dangerous
stimuli, which plays a crucial role in disen-
tangling the emotions of fear and anxiety.
The revised RST distinguishes between the
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) medi-
ating anxiety and the fight flight freez-
ing system (FFFS) reflecting fear. Whereas
anxiety represents the emotion elicited
when approaching potential threat (for
example in foraging) fear represents a “get
me out of here” emotion that operates
during active avoidance of non-ambiguous
threat and governs flight behavior or alter-
natively freezing or fight if flight is not
an option (for example in the immediate
vicinity of a predator). Both emotions are
conceptualized as distinct entities depend-
ing on defensive direction with careful
approach behavior in the context of poten-
tially dangerous stimuli to clarify the
stimuli’s nature vs. avoidance of a clear
threat. The BIS and FFFS are implemented
in distinct but parallel neural streams
(McNaugthon and Corr, 2006): Both neu-
ral streams are hierarchically organized
along a rostral-cortical (e.g., cingulate,
prefrontal cortex) to caudal-subcortical
(e.g., periaqueductal gray, hypothalamus,
amygdala) axis. Within each structure,
different nuclei or subdivisions activate
either fear or anxiety. Defensive distance,
which is the perceived intensity of threat
(Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990), deter-
mines which level of the hierarchy with
its associated behavioral output becomes
active in a given situation. Rostral regions
along the hierarchy are thought to react
to more distal threat while the caudal
regions are activated by proximal threat
(especially the periaqueductal gray). The
functioning of the BIS (i.e., the emo-
tion of anxiety), however, is not restricted
to the conflict that emerges in the ten-
sion between approach to, vs. avoidance
of potential threat but generalizes to all
forms of conflict that results from incom-
patible goals such as avoidance/avoidance
and approach/approach conflict.
The refinements to RST have been
based on experimental work in rodents but
the theory claims validity for human affec-
tive processing and personality as well.
In animal research the emotion of anxi-
ety has been investigated with a so called
“Visible Burrow System” (e.g., Blanchard
and Blanchard, 1989), where a rat is placed
in a setting prepared with cat odor in
the absence of an actual cat (Blanchard
et al., 2001). To a rat, a cat is a clear
threat but since its precise location can-
not be inferred from its odor alone, flight
is not likely to lead to safety. The differ-
ent information processed by the visual
and olfactory senses results in a conflict
that triggers the behavioral inhibition sys-
tem. By the activation of the BIS the
rat stops its present exploration behav-
ior (searching for food or a mate) and
orients itself toward the potential danger.
The rat resolves the conflict by obtain-
ing further information through careful
approach behavior. In consequence, either
the behavioral approach system (BAS) is
activated to return to the exploration of
the environment or the FFFS to cope with
the immediate danger (the latter is not
the case in the Visible Burrow system
paradigm).
The aforementioned cross species
translation from rodents to humans
requires empirical validation. For the
design of validation studies, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that RST is composed
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of two main components: A state com-
ponent that describes neural systems
including their reactivity and their asso-
ciated behavioral and emotional output
and a trait component describing stable
behavioral dispositions arising from indi-
vidual differences in the neural systems’
sensitivity (Corr and McNaughton, 2006).
Initially, RST set out in an Eysenckian tra-
dition as a biologically oriented theory
on human individual differences at the
trait level (Corr and Perkins, 2006) but
the refinement of the hypothesized neu-
robehavioral systems (the BIS, the FFFS,
and the BAS) in the theory’s revision have
been derived on the basis of ethopharma-
cological experiments and lesion studies in
rodents. Importantly, the animals used in
these studies were unselected rats, i.e., no
different strains of rats bred for individual
differences in fear- or anxiety proneness
were used. Thus, the initial formulation
of the revised RST has been based on the
analysis of states and changes in states
after experimental manipulation rather
than traits. This highlights the fact that
RST is not only a theory on personality
but a more general theory on emotion,
motivation and learning (Smillie et al.,
2006).
So far, the majority of translational
work has focused on human individual
differences on the trait level, either by
assessing predicted relationships between
trait anxiety and trait fear (e.g., Perkins
et al., 2007; Smederevac et al., 2014) or by
testing the influence of individual differ-
ences in relevant traits on behavioral states
(for meta-analysis see Leue and Beauducel,
2008). While these literatures were suc-
cessful in testing important predictions
within the scope of RST, they come with
the downside that the use of self-report
measures alone leaves a large body of RST
untouched. Particularly, they do not allow
for inference on the neural and neuro-
chemical implementation of the hypothe-
sized systems if no biological data is added
to these studies. Furthermore, any attempt
to link personality traits to individual dif-
ferences in behavior or the reactivity of
neural systems requires structurally valid
psychometric tools. Special caution must
be taken upon selecting such personality
questionnaires in order to avoid circu-
larity: As a structurally valid personality
questionnaire is ideally constructed on the
basis of the theory under scrutiny, any
favorable result can be interpreted as evi-
dence for the measurement tool or for the
theory’s prediction.
Here we argue for the importance
of well-designed experimental paradigms
that are crucial in the endeavor of trans-
lating non-human animal findings to our
species. We hold that it is particularly
important to derive paradigms that focus
on main effects of systematically varied
experimental context and pharmacologi-
cal manipulation on recordable behavior
and brain activity. The study of tran-
sient states rather than stable traits is an
important step toward establishing general
causal systems of human behavior that can
be subjected to the study of individual dif-
ferences in a second step. Of course, the
problem of circularity mentioned above is
not restricted to self-report measures and
can also apply to behavioral tasks. To avoid
or to reduce this problem, behavioral tasks
need to be designed to resemble the animal
tasks on which the refinements of RST are
based. If such a translated task responds
to different classes of drugs in humans
as predicted from animal data, it can be
confidentially used to test the individual
differences part of the theory as well.
Important questions in the context
of revised RST are: Can fear and anxi-
ety be dissociated in humans? Are fear
and anxiety elicited by active avoidance
of and approach to threat, respectively?
Can fear and anxiety be disentangled by
biological markers like for example gene
polymorphisms? And, are fear and anx-
iety modulated by panicolytic and anx-
iolytic drugs similar to pharmacological
effects in rodents? Perkins and colleagues
have addressed some of these questions
with an experimental task that has been
derived from a typical behavioral proto-
col in rodents (Perkins et al., 2009). In
the joystick-operated runway task (JORT),
participants determine an onscreen dot’s
speed in a runway by controlling a joystick.
The dot is chased by another onscreen dot
and if caught, a highly unpleasant burst
of white noise is emitted to the partici-
pant via headphones. Thus, participants
are motivated to escape the chasing dot
and the amount of force participants exert
on the joystick can be interpreted as a
proxy for active avoidance or in other
words fear. In a second version of the task,
the participant’s dot is not only chased
by one dot, there is also another dot in
the runway running in front of the par-
ticipant’s dot. The unpleasant burst of
noise is not only emitted when the par-
ticipant’s dot gets caught but also if it
is run into the dot upfront. Thus, in
order to escape the chasing dot, partici-
pants have to approach a potential threat,
which is experienced as conflict or, in other
words, anxiety. The emotion of anxiety is
quantified by the amount of back- and
forth oscillations with the joystick han-
dle while avoiding both threatening dots.
Key findings from pharmacological exper-
iments with the JORT are that anxiolytic
but not anti-panic drugs affect anxiety in
terms of approach-withdrawal oscillations
(Perkins et al., 2009). A similar relation-
ship between anti-panic drugs and active
avoidance, however, was not observed.
Active avoidance in the JORT was however
affected by a risk gene variant for panic
disorder as predicted by RST (Perkins
et al., 2011). The study of genetic variation
is also a feasible means to probe neuro-
transmitter systems and has the advantage
of being free from side effects. In contrast
to RST predictions, however, a more recent
study confirmed a dose dependent effect
of an anxiolytic drug on active avoidance,
an effect that depended on baseline indi-
vidual differences on a fear scale (Perkins
et al., 2013). Taken together, the JORT
was successful in confirming three out of
five predictions. It failed, however, to pro-
vide evidence for the core theme of the
revised RST, a double dissociation of fear
and anxiety, either on the pharmacologi-
cal or on the molecular genetic level. This
emphasizes the requirement to validate the
state part of the theory separately from
the trait part. Replication of these results,
however, is needed to justify refinement of
human RST, especially since other behav-
ioral experiments have confirmed that fear
and anxiety can be separated in human
facial expressions (Perkins et al., 2012).
A general problem with translational
fear research is that levels of experimen-
tally induced fear might vary consider-
ably across species and only a rather
small amount of fear may be triggered
in humans for ethical reasons. To paral-
lel findings from rodent studies, it might
be wise to use innate (but harmless) fear
stimuli such as spiders, which are likely to
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elicit phobic reactions in humans. Mobbs
et al. (2010) varied the proximity of a huge
tarantula to the feet of healthy human
participants while they were undergoing
neuroimaging to test the effect of threat
proximity on the responsiveness of dif-
ferent levels of the neural fear hierarchy.
This paradigm activates the FFFS because
a dangerous stimulus is presented that is
unavoidable. As predicted, distant threats
were more likely to activate the rostral part
of the fear axis (such as prefrontal cortices)
while proximal threats activated the caudal
parts of the hierarchy such as the amyg-
dala or the periaqueductal gray. Similar
findings were obtained by the same group
(Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009) using a pacman-
style computer game where the participant
was chased through a labyrinth and was
subjected to a painful cutaneous electric
shock when caught. While these experi-
mental protocols were successful in testing
the neural fear hierarchy and its depen-
dence upon defensive distance, they do not
allow any conclusion on the anxiety hier-
archy or on the dissociation of fear and
anxiety. The combination of ethopharma-
cology with neuroimaging or etho-genetic
imaging studies (e.g., Montag et al., 2008)
will help to shed light on these questions.
Behavioral experiments as described
above will overcome issues of social desir-
ability in answering self-reports and pro-
vide ecologically valid data on human
behavior—if operationalized in the correct
way. An automated fear response elicited
by an approaching spider, and the threat
of loud bursts or electric shocks will be
more instructive for neuropsychological
theories than a questionnaire score that
results from the reflection on past behav-
ior, behavioral dispositions, and emotional
states.
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